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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Santos Tena appeals from the judgment and conviction entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance, claiming 
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Tena's conviction for possession of methamphetamine is based on the 
following account from the presentence report ("PSI"): 
On April 27, 2011, at approximately 0725 hours, Deputy Bernad 
was dispatched to 491 E Hwy 81 to serve to [sic] warrants on 
Santos Tena, one from Cassia County and one from Twin Falls 
County. Dispatch advised that Veronica Tena reported Santos was 
staying at that address and that his father thought people were 
bringing him drugs. 
Deputy Bemad and Deputy Garrett arrived and made contact with 
Revecca Tena, mother of Santos Tena. When asked whether 
Santos was in the home, she pointed down the stairs and said that 
he was asleep. She called down to him and he came to the bottom 
of the stairs arguing with her. Deputies then went to the bottom of 
the stairs and advised Santos he was under arrest. ... 
Deputy Bemad spoke with Mrs. Tena and she signed a consent to 
search form for the residence. Upon entering Santos' room, 
Deputy Bemad noticed a baggie containing a white crystal 
substance, in plain view. The baggie was on the couch cushion, 
along with a pocket knife, and the substance inside the baggie later 
presumptively tested positive for methamphetamine. On the floor in 
front of the couch, Deputy Bernad observed something wrapped in 
a blue paper towel. The item was found to be a pipe with a burnt 
brown residue. Deputy Bernad also located a coin purse containing 
a glass pipe and five small Ziploc baggies between the cushion and 
the arm rest of the couch. 
(PSI, p.3.) 
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The state charged Tena with felony possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine or amphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia, and 
alleged he was a persistent violator. (R., pp.74-76.) Tena filed a motion to 
suppress.1 After a hearing and the submission of briefs, the district court denied 
Tena's motion, ruling that the search of his bedroom was legal because his 
mother consented to the search and had apparent authority to do so. (Tr., pp.97-
118.) Tena entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal the 
denial of his suppression motion. (R., pp.127-141.) The district court imposed a 
unified seven-year sentence with one year fixed. (R., pp.159-162.) Tena filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.165-167.) 
1 According to the district court, Tena filed his suppression motion on December 
6, 2011 (Tr., p.5, Ls.8-10), however, that motion has not been included in the 
record on appeal. 
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ISSUE 
Tena states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Tena's motion to 
suppress, because Ms. Tena did not have authority to consent to 
the search of his bedroom? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Tena failed to establish the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
Tena Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Tena challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that his 
mother did not have apparent or actual authority to consent to the search of his 
bedroom. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-20.) Contrary to Tena's argument, the district 
court correctly concluded that the search was constitutionally valid because 
Tena's mother had the apparent authority to consent to such a search. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006); State v. Barker, 136 
Idaho 278,280,40 P.3d 86, 88 (2002); State v. Spencer, 139 Idaho 736,738,85 
P.3d 1135, 1137 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Devore, 134 Idaho 344, 346-47, 2 P.3d 
153, 155-56 (Ct. App. 2000). 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying 
Tena's Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches of an individual's 
home absent certain limited exceptions. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 
(1990). One clearly recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent 
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from an individual who has actual or apparent authority to submit to the search. 
State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,219,984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999). Where it is later 
established that a third party who consented to a search lacked actual authority 
to consent, the search may still be upheld if the law enforcement officers 
reasonably believed that actual authority existed. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89; 
Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219,984 P.2d at 707. "The key to the apparent authority 
exception to the warrant requirement is the concept of reasonableness." Brauch, 
133 Idaho at 219, 984 P.2d at 707, citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183-88. 
Officers must have an objectively reasonable belief that the person giving 
consent has the authority to do so. That is, the determination must "be judged 
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the 
moment ... 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the consenting 
party had authority over the premises?" Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). Therefore, to assess whether apparent 
authority exists, "one must look for indicia of actual authority." United States v. 
Rosario, 962 F.2d 733, 737 (ih Cir. 1992) (quoting United States V. Miller, 800 
F.2d 129, 134 (ih Cir. 1986)). 
The district court denied Tena's suppression motion, concluding that the 
deputies reasonably believed Ms. Tena had actual authority to consent to a 
search of her home and Tena's bedroom, explaining (with bracketed citations to 
suppression hearing testimony): 
The gravamen of the Defendant's argument is that Ms. Tena 
lacked the authority to consent to the search of the Defendant's 
bedroom in her house because he was paying rent. However, 
regardless of whether Ms. Tena had actual authority to consent to 
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the search of the Defendant's bedroom, she had apparent authority 
to do so. 
At the time the officers secured Ms. Tena's consent and 
searched the Defendant's bedroom they were aware of several 
relevant circumstances. The residence belonged to Ms. Tena and 
her husband. [Tr., p.?, L.23 - p.8, L.4.] Ms. Tena told the officers 
that she had access to the house. [Tr., p.33, Ls.12-13.] There was 
no evidence that the Defendant had a key to his bedroom door; that 
he used the old skeleton key lock to prevent access to his 
bedroom; that the Defendant used a more modern lock on his 
bedroom door; or that the Defendant had the ability to exclude his 
parents from his bedroom. [Tr., p.24, L.22 - p.25, L.6.] Ms. Tena's 
statement that she did the Defendant's laundry and took meals to 
him in his bedroom gives rise to a reasonable inference that the 
Defendant did not exclude Ms. Tena in any meaningful way from 
that area of her residence. [Tr., p.33, Ls.21-25; p.50, Ls.2-5.] 
Based on these circumstances, the officers reasonably believed 
that Ms. T ena had ready access and common control over the 
Defendant's bedroom as part of her residence, and that she could 
consent to a search. 
Although the Defendant asserts that he was a tenant in his 
parents' residence, Ms. T ena did not mention that the Defendant 
paid rent or that there was a rental agreement at the time of the 
search. [Tr., p.34, Ls.2-?; p.50, Ls.8-11; p.59, Ls.6-13.] There was 
nothing that the officers observed at the time of the search that 
would give rise to the inference that the Defendant and his parents 
had a landlord-tenant relationship. Therefore, even if the officers 
erroneously believed Ms. Tena had authority to consent to a search 
of the Defendant's bedroom, their belief was reasonable based on 
the totality of the circumstances. Ms. Tena had apparent authority 
to consent to the search. 
(PSI, pp.5-6.) 
As the district court held, regardless of whether Ms. Tena had actual 
authority to consent to a search of Tena's bedroom, the facts available to the 
deputies at the moment Ms. Tena consented to their entry into her house and 
Tena's bedroom gave rise to a reasonable belief she that she did. In sum, the 
court based its decision on testimony showing (1) the home was owned by Ms. 
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Tena and her husband, (2) Ms. Tena had access to the home, (3) Tena did not 
lock his bedroom door, (4) Ms. Tena did Tena's laundry and prepared his meals 
and took them to Tena's bedroom because he hardly ever left the room, and (5) 
there was no mention of anything suggesting Tena rented the bedroom. Id. 
Additionally, Deputy Garrett testified that when he explained to Ms. Tena 
what was written on the consent and permission to search form (see State's 
Exhibit 1), he told her "it was a permission to search her room - or, I mean, the 
house and Santos's room[,]" and she did not seem to have any hesitation in 
understanding him, and "just said yes and signed the form .... " (Tr., p.30, L.8 -
p.32, L.11 (emphasis added).) Therefore, after it was made clear to Ms. Tena 
that the deputies intended to search Tena's bedroom, she still did not object to 
that request. Deputy Bernad testified that before obtaining Ms. Tena's consent to 
search her home, she told him she had to go into Tena's bedroom not only to 
take him meals and do his laundry, but also to "clean." (Tr., p.50, Ls.2-5.) 
Tena argues that the deputies '''lacked an objectively reasonable basis to 
believe [Ms. Tena] had joint access to and mutual use of the [bedroom] without 
some further inquiry.",2 (Appellant's Brief, p.10 (quoting State v. Benson, 133 
Idaho 152, 158, 983 P.2d 225, 231 (Ct. App. 1999).) As a central theme of his 
argument, Tena contends the record shows that when he was being led away 
2 Tena's argument has consistently been that his mother lacked both actual and 
apparent authority to consent to the officers' search of his bedroom. Tena did 
not argue in the district court, nor does he argue on appeal, that as a (supposed) 
co-tenant, he had a co-equal right to deny officers permission to enter his 
bedroom, even if his mother granted such permission. See Georgia v. Randolph, 
547 U.S. 103 (2006); (see also R., pp.97-100, 115-118; Tr., p.62, Ls.7-23 (setting 
briefing schedule in lieu of argument).) As a result, a factual record has not been 
developed relevant to such a claim. 
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from the house he "yelled to not let the deputies into the house or his bedroom." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10 (emphasis added); see id., p.11 ("Tena actively objected 
to the deputies' entry and search of his bedroom."); p.12 ("Mr. Tena yelled to not 
let the deputies into the house or his bedroom."); p.13 ("he yelled not to let the 
deputies into the house or his bedroom," and "the deputies here knew that ... 
Mr. Tena had objected to their entry and search of the bedroom").) Contrary to 
Tena's claim, Deputy Bernad, the only state witness to testify on the subject, 
explained that after Tena was handcuffed, "he started yelling not to let us in the 
house as he was taken out to the car" -- without any mention of the bedroom. 
(Tr., p.55, Ls.17-20.) 
In repeatedly stating on appeal that he objected to officers searching his 
bedroom, Tena appears to rely on the following question his trial attorney posed 
to Deputy Bernad: "Where was Santos when you say he was yelling to not let 
you in the house or his room?" (Tr., p.58, Ls.2-3 (emphasis added); see 
Appellant's Brief, pp.10-13.) The deputy went ahead and answered the general 
call of the question of where the yelling incident took place even though the 
question also improperly assumed testimony that had not been given - i.e., that 
Tena yelled to not let officers in his bedroom. To the extent Tena's arguments on 
appeal rely upon the inaccurate contention that he yelled that the officers not be 
permitted to search his room, they fail. 
Contrary to Tena's assertions on appeal, this evidence establishes that 
Ms. Tena had apparent authority to consent to the search of the bedroom. 
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The district court correctly concluded that the search of Tena's bedroom 
was properly conducted pursuant to Ms. Tena's consent and did not violate any 
of Tena's rights. Tena's claim of error in relation to his suppression motion, 
therefore, fails. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Tena's judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 2013. 
JO~ /, C. McKINNEY ( 
DeR y Attorney Genera4/' 
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